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I. INTRODUCTION
Substantive antitrust law has dramatically shrunk. The shrinkage,
which began in the 1970s with the transition from the Warren Court to the
Burger and then Rehnquist Courts, has accelerated in the last decade. Much
of the shrinkage has to do with the expansion of the rule of reason and its
displacement of per se rules.' The Supreme Court has gone so far as to
state that it "presumptively" applies the rule of reason while per se illegality
is limited to a "narrow category of activity.",
2
It is axiomatic that the rule of reason has an inverse effect on the
breadth of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (Section 1).' Rule of reason cases
are far more difficult to win than are per se cases and are thus much less
frequently even initiated.4  Instances of actual antitrust liability are
significantly reduced even among cases that are litigated . Thus, the
broader the rule of reason, the more limited is the reach of Section 1. The
result is fewer wins for private plaintiffs, who often cannot prove the
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' See David L. Meyers, We Should Not Let the Ongoing Rationalization of Antitrust Lead to the
Marginalization ofAntitust, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1175,1179-81 (2008).
2 See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5, 8 (2006). This is a far cry from the Supreme Court's
position forty years ago. For example, in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10
(1972) the Court described how it favored per se roles because of their predictability and the judiciary's
"limited utility in examining difficult economic problems." The Court went on to opine that Congress
could always strike down per se rules and "leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic
theory in order to maintain a flexible approach." Id. at 609 n.10.
' 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of
Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009) (examining the present and historical impact of the rule of reason on
antitrust rules and standards).
4 See, e.g., Texaco, Inc., 547 U.S. 1 (2006); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
The government enforcement agencies never pursue rule of reason cases and many private suits are
abandoned once a court rules that the underlying offense is subject to the rule of reason. See, e.g.,
Texaco, Inc., 547 U.S. at 4.
5 See Stucke, supra note 3, at 1423-24.
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market effect required by the rule of reason.6 In addition, the Supreme
Court's Twombly7 and Iqbal8 decisions have wrought more exacting
pleading requirements to state a viable Sherman Act claim.9
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Section 2) has seemingly followed the
same path, with the Supreme Court limiting, or perhaps simply refusing to
expand, what constitutes exclusionary conduct by a monopolist.1 ° In the
last decade, the Court has rejected Section 2 claims based on a dominant
company's refusal to cooperate with a competitor,11 as well as so-called
predatory bidding
12 and price squeezes.'
3
Thus, it is apparent that substantive antitrust law, under both Sections 1
and 2, is indeed shrinking. Of course, all of this is part and parcel of a
seemingly ever-changing antitrust paradigm. In the last fifty years, we have
seen a Supreme Court shift from a scenario where plaintiffs always won,
14
to a scenario where they rarely do.' 5 We have gone from an unworkable,
multi-purposed antitrust law, which sometimes (but who knew when)
protected small business, to an efficiency and consumer welfare model, to
recognition that sometimes efficiency and consumer welfare are not
simpatico. 16
6 Id at 1423-26.
7 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
8 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
9 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684
'0 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S.
Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) ("Since the mid-1970s, develop-ments in U.S. antitrust doctrine and enforcement
policy have narrowed the range of dominant firm conduct that is subject to condemnation.").
" Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004).
12 Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 326 (2007).
13 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 442 (2009).
"4 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The
sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under [Section] 7, the Government always wins.").
15 See, e.g., Ellen Meriwether, Putting the "Squeeze" on Refusal to Deal Cases: Lessons from
Trinko and linkLine, ANTITRUST, Spring 2010, at 65 ("The U.S. Supreme Court has issued a number of
significant antitrust decisions since 2004, in each case ruling in favor of the defendants, and in each case
making it more difficult for plaintiffs to commence or maintain actions arising under the Sherman
Act.").
16 See generally Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction ofHomo Economicus and the Eclipse of
the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and Behavioral Antitrust
Analyses, 42 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 469 (2011); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Reckoning of Post-Chicago
Antitrust, in POST-CIHCAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 1 (Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto
Pardolesi & Roger Van den Bergh eds., 2002) (arguing that, while conservative economists did produce
some antitrust enforcement strategies, their attempts failed to simplify enforcement); John B. Kirkwood,
The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2425 (2013); Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of
Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
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But what impact has this recalibration of antitrust law had on the
antitrust gap, that divide between Sections 1 and 2 first recognized in the
1919 United States v. Colgate & Co. decision17 and reaffirmed and more
elaborately described by the Supreme Court in its 1984 Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp. decision?18 In the first twenty-five or so years
after Copperweld, many believed the case to be a seminal one, not because
of its dismantling of the so-called intra-enterprise or "bathtub" conspiracy
doctrine, but because of its distinction of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.1 9 The Copperweld Court's rearticulation of the antitrust gap nicely
illustrated the point that the antitrust laws seek to protect competition, not
competitors, since it posits that unilateral conduct by non-monopolists
cannot violate either section of the Sherman Act.20 This undeterred middle
21is where firms compete, unfettered by antitrust concerns.
Stated somewhat differently, the gap signifies that the Sherman Act
does not reach "unfair" competition unilaterally engaged in by non-
monopolists, leaving that type of conduct for recourse under state tort law
or perhaps Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.22 Thus, if one understands the
gap, one has a good grasp of the essential structure of the antitrust laws.23
In an insightful article published in 2000, however, Professor Andrew
Gavil argued that the importance of the antitrust gap was diminishing
because, in oversimplified terms, antitrust decisions had increased Section
l's proof standards while relaxing the proof requirements of Section 2.24
Professor Gavil's arguments cast doubt on the ability of the gap to vividly
demonstrate the intent of the Sherman Act to outlaw only monopolistic
conduct or collective action which restrains trade but to leave alone
2349 (2013); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On the Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics, in HOW THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON
U.S. ANTITRUST 51 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (arguing that emphasizing economic efficiencies in
antitrust enforcement overshot the mark).
17 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) ("In the absence of any purpose to create
or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties
with whom he will deal.").
18 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
19 See C. PAUL ROGERS M ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 413-20 (4th ed. 2008).
20 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767-68.
21 Id. at 767.
22 LanhamTrademarkAct§ 43(a), 15U.S.C.§ 1125(a)(2012).
23 Of course, exceptions or "inroads" to the gap have always existed. For example, the attempted
monopolization prohibition in Section 2 by its terms applies to single-firm conduct by non-monopolists. See
Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,456 (1993) (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767-68).
24 Andrew I. Gavil, Copperweld 2000: The Vanishing Gap Between Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 88 (2000). In coming to that conclusion, Professor Gavil asserted
that there existed a convergence of the direct evidence of the market power necessary for rule of reason
liability under Section 1 with proof of the monopoly power required for a Section 2 offense. Id. at 89.
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unilateral action by non-monopolists, even though some bad market
behavior may go unfettered.25
But the question remains of what impact has the continued shrinkage
of antitrust law in the new millennium, substantively and procedurally, had
on the gap? For example, what is the impact on the gap of the recent
American Needle v. National Football League decision in which the
Supreme Court relied heavily on Copperweld in holding that the thirty-two
National Football League (NFL) franchises were not a single entity when
exclusively licensing their various logos?26 Also, what is the impact on the
gap of the expansion of the rule of reason, increasing procedural hurdles,
and the restriction of what can constitute exclusionary conduct in an action
under Section 2?
In sum, it would seem to be an appropriate time to consider the impact
of modem antitrust law on the gap. Is it shrinking, shifting, or is there now
perhaps an inverse gap whereby conduct now insufficient to prove a Section
1 violation might establish a Section 2 offense?27 The Copperweld Court
itself recognized that "the size of any such gap is open to serious
question.,28 I thus hope in this Article to shed some light on the impact of
antitrust law's continuing shrinkage on the antitrust gap and to suggest what
that impact signifies for the future of antitrust.
II. COPPER WELD, AMERICAN NEEDLE, AND THE GAP
Copperweld involved the attempts of a parent company, the
Copperweld Corporation, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Regal Tube
Company, to thwart the entry of the Independence Tube Corporation, a
potential competitor of Regal, into the structural steel tubing market.29
Independence's founder was a former president of Regal who was not
covered by a non-compete clause when Copperweld purchased Regal from
25 Id. at 87.
26 Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 130 S. Ct. 2201,2215 (2010).
27 If, for example, proof of concerted action under Section 1 has continued to become more difficult
while proof standards for exclusionary conduct under Section 2 have continued to become less exacting,
we could conceivably have circumstances in which conduct insufficient to violate Section 1 may
nonetheless constitute exclusionary conduct under Section 2. See Gavil, supra note 24, at 88.
28 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 776-77.
29 Id. at 756-77. The Yoder Company was also sued and alleged to be part of the conspiracy. Id. at
757. It had entered into an agreement o build a mill for Independence but breached the contract in the
face of an intimidating letter from Copperweld. Id. The jury, however, found that Yoder was not part of
the conspiracy but liable only for breach of contract. Id at 757-58. Thus, the jury verdict against
Copperweld and Regal for $2,499,009 before trebling rested solely on the actions of Copperweld and
Regal, raising the validity of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine on appeal. See id.
[Vol. 52:67
The Incredible Shrinking Antitrust Law
its former parent company, Lear Siegler, Inc.30 The alleged conspiracy took
the form of a variety of actions by Copperweld and Regal designed to
hinder or stop Independence's entry into the market, including threatened
legal action against banks and other entities considering doing business
with Independence.31  As a result of the defendants' actions,
Independence's entry into the market was delayed by nine months.32
The Supreme Court considered only the "narrow issue ... whether a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in
violation of [Section] 1 of the Sherman Act. 33 In holding that they could
not since "[a] parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity
of interest" and common objective,3 4 the Court relied on Congress's
"purposeful choice to accord different treatment to unilateral and concerted
conduct" which created an acknowledged gap in the reach of the Sherman
Act.35 The Court concluded that to find a conspiracy on the facts before it
would require it to "second guess the judgment of Congress to limit
[Section] 1 to concerted conduct.,36  By striking the intra-enterprise
doctrine, the Court believed it was simply eliminating "private state tort
suits masquerading as antitrust actions.,
37
In identifying the antitrust gap by name for the first time, the Court
noted that Congress had left it "for eminently sound reasons" since
"[s]ubjecting a single firm's every action to judicial scrutiny for
reasonableness would threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm
that the antitrust laws seek to promote.38 Further, if unreasonable restraints
of trade were unlawful absent collective action, "[Section] l's requirement
of a contract, combination, or conspiracy would be superfluous, as would
the entirety of [Section] 2.
The Copperweld Court noted that under the Sherman Act concerted
conduct is treated more strictly than unilateral conduct because it
30 Id at 756.
31 Id. at 756-57.
32 Id. at 757.
31 Id. at 767.
34 Id. at771.
" Id. at 775.
36 Id. at 776.
37 Id. at 777.
38 Id. at 775.
39 Id. at 775. Here, the Court referenced United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) as
"at least" the starting point of its recognition "that [Section] 1 is limited to concerted conduct[.]"
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 775-76.
2013]
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"inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk."4 According to the Court,
collusion deprives the marketplace and consumers of the competition that
flows from rival and independent decision makers.41 In contrast, the Court
pointed out that an overzealous enforcement of single-firm conduct would
increase the risk that robust competition by an aggressive competitor would
be deemed unreasonable.42
Thus, the Copperweld gap seems predicated on (1) an assumption that
Section 1 should be enforced more aggressively than Section 2 and (2)
single-firm conduct, absent monopoly or near monopoly power, should be
beyond the antitrust pale. The rationale for the gap is that concerted action
is more likely to be anticompetitive than single-firm conduct and that to
target single-firm conduct, at least by non-monopolists, could have the
inverse effect of curtailing competitive zeal.43
In American Needle,44 the Supreme Court recently relied heavily on
Copperweld in holding that the NFL was not a single entity for purposes of
entering into exclusive licensing agreements for the trademarked apparel of
its thirty-two franchises.45 The league, through its NFL Properties (NFLP)
entity, had negotiated an exclusive licensing agreement with Reebok to
supply trademarked headwear for all thirty-two teams.46 The plaintiff, a
competing headwear manufacturer, sued, asserting that the exclusive license
was in fact a concerted refusal to deal in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.4 7 Interestingly, American Needle was the obverse factually
of Copperweld since it presented a group of separately owned entities
operating in an environment controlled by a central organization, the
league.48 The Court followed Copperweld's ubstance over form approach
to find that the refusal of the NFL to license the intellectual property of
individual NFL teams should be treated as an agreement among the teams
because it "'depriv[es] the marketplace of independent centers of
decisionmaking,' and therefore of actual or potential competition.A9
40 Id. at 768-69.
4 1 Id.
42 Id. at 768. The Court was further concerned with the difficulty of always "distinguish[ing]
robust competition from conduct with long-run anticompetitive effects[.]" Id. at 767-68.
41 Seei id. at 767-69.




48 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTmTUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 205 (4th ed. 2011).
49 Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2213 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
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While the American Needle Court did not directly refer to the antitrust
gap, it did reaffirm Copperweld's dual tenets that concerted conduct is more
strictly scrutinized than independent action because of the heightened
anticompetitive risk of the former and the threat of deterring procompetitive
conduct from the latter.50 As a result, the Court noted, a Section 1 violation
may occur even though the conduct does not "'threate[n]
monopolization.' 51 The Court then observed that, "because concerted
action is discrete and distinct," the vast amount of non-collusive business
conduct is left untouched.
5 2
Thus, as recently as the 2010 American Needle decision, the Supreme
Court has pointed to the reasoning of Copperweld to reaffirm the
relationship of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and thus, implicitly at
least, recognized the continued existence of the gap. But the fact that the
gap continues to exist, at least theoretically, is only the beginning of the
inquiry about its vitality, size, and breadth. What is seemingly a
straightforward, rather simple proposition is in fact complicated by a
number of factors including: (1) the impact of the growth of the rule of
reason in Section 1 cases and the requirement of proof of market power;
53
(2) the seeming contraction of what constitutes exclusionary conduct by an
alleged monopolist for purposes of establishing a Section 2 offense;54 and
(3) the impact of heightened pleading requirements following the Twombly
decision.55
III. THE RULE OF REASON
Of course, generally speaking, resort to the rule of reason favors the
defendant, particularly where proof of market power is required.56 Thus, as
Professor Gavil noted, an expanding rule of reason accompanied by the
proof of market power arguably tends to blur the line between Section 1 and
752, 769 (1984)).
5 Id. at 2209.
51 Id (quoting Copperweld at 467 U.S. at 768).
52 id.
53 SeeGavil, supra note 24, at 98; see also Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2213, 2216.
54 See Copperweld at 467 U.S. at 775-76.
55 Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To that list, one might add the Federal Trade
Commission's prior attempts to use § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to attack unilateral actions
by non-monopolists, see for example E.1 du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.
1984), but there has been little enforcement activity along these lines in recent years. See also Boise
Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
56 A notable exception is NCAA v. Bd of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984), where
the Court struck down the National Collegiate Athletic Association's [NCAA] television plan for the
telecast of collegiate football games as unreasonable under the rule of reason. Id at 120.
2013]
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Section 2 and diminish the gap.57 That is, if both Sections 1 and 2 require
proof of market power, the two statutes may not be all that distinct after all.
Further, Section 2 may be, in some instances, a more powerful antitrust
enforcement ool than Section 1, which requires proof of collective action in
addition to market power.
5 8
As it turns out, both Copperweld and American Needle were rule of
reason cases, albeit for different reasons. In American Needle, the Court
followed the reasoning in its National Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n (NCAA) v.
Board of Regents decision59 and held that the interests of NFL teams in the
success of the league and the need to cooperate in scheduling games
"provides a perfectly sensible justification for making a host of collective
decisions.' '60  Indeed, the Court appeared to have provided heavy-handed
guidance about the likely outcome of the case under the rule of reason on
remand when it noted that "[f]ootball teams that need to cooperate are not
trapped by antitrust law ' 61 and concluded by stating that "[i]n such
instances, the agreement is likely to survive the Rule of Reason.,
62
Thus, the American Needle Court's resort to the rule of reason may
have been outcome determinative. Under the per se rule, the NFLP's
exclusive licensing of trademarked headwear to one vendor, Reebok, would
seem to be unlawful price fixing, since it effectively eliminates all price
competition among the thirty-two teams who formed the NFLP.63 If it was
57 See Gavil, supra note 24, at 98-99. See also Stephen Calkins, Copperweld in the Courts: The
Road to Caribe, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 345, 365-67 (1995).
58 Of course, one could profitably argue that the converse is more often true since Section 2
requires proof of exclusionary or "bad" conduct, which in recent years appears to be an increasingly
difficult hurdle to surmount. See infra text accompanying notes 126-35.
'9 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117.
60 Am. Needle, Inc., v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010). It relied on both Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 252 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting), stating ' [t]he special characteristics
of this industry may provide a justification' for many kinds of agreements[J" and NCAA, 468 U.S. at
101, stating "[w]hen 'restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all,' per se
rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be judged according to the flexible rule
of reason." Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2216.
61 Id.
62 Id. The "instances" referred to were from the NCAA decision justifying the rule of reason
because "'a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of competition that [the NCAA] and its
member institutions seek to market is to be preserved."' Id. (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101).
63 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) ("Under the Sherman
Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of commodity... is illegal per se."). See also Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S.
46, 49-50 (1990) (holding that a market division between rivals with resulting price increase was per se
price fixing); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99-100 (suggesting that the NCAA's television plan which limited
output and eliminated price competition among member schools would ordinarily be per se illegal);
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that an agreement
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so characterized, no assessment of the relevant market and proof of market
power would be necessary.64
Application of the rule of reason, however, provides a different kettle
of fish. In order to prevail, the plaintiff must prove an adverse market
impact and thus must provide proof that the defendant has some indicia of
65market power. To show market power, a plaintiff must typically define
the relevant market narrowly so as to establish that the defendant has a
sizeable market share, which can translate into market power. For example,
in International Boxing Club v. United States,66 the Supreme Court held
that championship boxing matches were uniquely attractive to fans and thus
constituted a market separate and distinct from non-championship fights.67
In the NCAA case, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding
that college football broadcasts were a market separate and apart from
broadcasts of other sporting or entertainment events and that, as a result, the
NCAA possessed market power with respect to those broadcasts.68
None of the courts in the American Needle case considered the relevant
market issue, given the focus of the litigation on the single entity defense.69
Presumably, determination of the issue would involve whether NFL teams'
trademarked apparel competed with the trademarked apparel of other
professional sports franchises as well as colleges with so-called "big-time"
athletics programs. Although demand for trademarked apparel is no doubt
somewhat localized, many highly successful teams, such as the New
England Patriots, the New York Yankees, the Los Angeles Lakers, and the
University of Texas Longhorns appear to have national followings, at least
judged by the appearance of their licensed apparel throughout the country.7 °
among beer wholesalers to eliminate short-term credit sales to retailers was illegal price fixing per se);
Nat'l Soc'y ofProf'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (holding that an agreement not
to compete in terms of price or output is illegal without an "elaborate industry analysis"). It might also
be subject to attack as a per se illegal boycott under the reasoning of cases such as FTC v. Super. Ct.
Trial Lawyers, Ass 'n, 493 U.S. 411, 435-36 (1990) (agreement of court-appointed criminal lawyers to
refuse court appointments characterized as per se illegal boycott and per se illegal price fixing), and St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 552-53 (1978) (refusal of malpractice insurance
companies to issue policies on an "occurrence" rather than "claims made" basis held to be a boycott
even though conspirators' competitors were not the target of the conspiracy).
64 See, e.g., Nat'! Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (holding that "no elaborate industry
analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character" of an agreement not to compete in
terms of price or output).
65 See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2008).
66 Int'l Boxing Club ofN.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
67 Id. at 252.
" NCAA, 468 U.S. at 111-12.
69 Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit upheld the single entity defense. See Am. Needle,
Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2008); Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F.
Supp. 2d 941, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
70 See, e.g., Corporate Information: About Us, LIDS, httpl/www.fids.com/HelpDesk/Corporate/About
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It is, of course, not my purpose to hazard a guess as to the relevant
market, but rather to explore the impact of the likely options. If, for
example, the relevant market is limited to the licensed apparel of NFL
franchises, the exclusive licensing agreement would likely be deemed to be
unreasonable.7' Consumer choice would be limited to one brand in the
relevant market and the plaintiff could probably establish a resulting
reduction of output and increase in price.
If, on the other hand, the NFLP is found to compete with other
professional sports leagues and/or colleges, its market share would likely
reveal something less than monopoly power.
72 If, however, professional
football is found to indeed be the most popular sport in the United States, as
is reputed, the market foreclosure of the exclusive license could still be
substantial.73 Further, the Court in the NCAA case, while finding market
power existed, asserted that its proof was not necessary where collective
action restricted price or output.
74
Although the Supreme Court has long applied the rule of reason to
exclusive dealing arrangements because of the long-term efficiencies they
are said to engender,75 those cases typically involve bilateral contractual
arrangements, not a collective decision by competitors to deal with one
supplier.76  In any event, if the Copperweld admonition about the
(last visited Sept 15, 2013). One can find "lid" or cap stores in most malls and major airports in the country,
offering trademarked caps of professional teams of all sports and many "major' colleges side by side. See, e.g.,
id
71 See, e.g., James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust Claims
After American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 529-30 & n.51 (2011).
72 See HDC Med., Inc. v. MinnTech Corp., 474 F.3d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 2007) ("To establish that a
defendant possesses the requisite market power required for monopolization liability, a plaintiff must establish
that the defendant has a dominant market share in a well-defined relevant market.").
73 Major competitors would probably be Major League Baseball, the National Basketball
Association, major college football and basketball, and perhaps NASCAR. Michael McCarthy, Look







News%29. The National Hockey League might follow along with Major League Soccer and other
professional individual sports such as tennis and golf. Id.
74 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984). Of course, the
exclusive licensing in American Needle may not have contained any express output limitations and may
have reduced costs. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). But more licensed vendors
would presumably produce more trademarked hats which would have the tendency to lower prices. See
FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (holding that "proof of actual detrimental
effects such as" loss of market power can eliminate need to prove market power); see also Angelico v.
Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 276 (3d Cir. 1999); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668-69 (3d Cir. 1993).
75 See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-29 (1961); see also Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 46 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); FTC v. Brown Shoe
Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966).
76 Hyde, 466 U.S. at 5-7; Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. at 317-19; Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at
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anticompetitive dangers of concerted action remains valid, an agreement of
rivals, even among those who must cooperate in some respects, which
forecloses a substantial hunk of a market through a collective exclusive
licensing agreement must be highly suspect.77 If it is not, then the antitrust
gap is surely shrinking or, at a minimum, becoming more blurred as the
demarcation between what constitutes a restraint of trade under Section 1
becomes more uncertain.
Copperweld is also, at least implicitly, a rule of reason case. In
addition to the intra-enterprise conspiracy question, the petitioners' writ of
certiorari had asked the Court to consider whether injury to competition
could be established in a rule of reason case without a relevant market
analysis and proof of sufficient market power to adversely affect that
market.v8 Although the Court denied certiorari on the issue, it nonetheless
managed to briefly but meaningfully weigh in on the question.79  After
pointing out that the per se rule applies to certain types of concerted action,
the Court noted:
Other combinations, such as mergers, joint ventures, and various vertical
agreements, hold the promise of increasing a firm's efficiency and
enabling it to compete more effectively. Accordingly, such combinations
are judged under a rule of reason, an inquiry into market power and
market structure designed to assess the combination's actual effect.
80
Although one could assert that Copperweld's market power language
should be limited to the types of combinations described, it does go beyond
the Court's prior articulations of rule of reason content.81 Thus, ironically,
the decision that acknowledged the antitrust gap and its importance is also
responsible for diminishing its size. While the Copperweld Court "note[d]
,,12that the size of any such gap is open to serious question, its requirement
of market power for rule of reason cases arising under Section 1 is not far
from Section 2's requirement of monopoly or near monopoly power.
83
321-22.
77 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Co., 467 U.S 752, 767-70 (1984).
78 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1-2, Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-1260).
Petitioners claimed that it was undisputed that the affected market was highly competitive and argued
that the lower courts had found a violation without duly considering market factors. Id at 40-41.
79 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768-69.
80 Id. at 768 (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Chi. Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)).
81 See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 57, at 365-66; Diane Wood Hutchinson, Antitrust 1984: Five
Decisions in Search of a Theory, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 69, 144-45.
82 Copperweld, 462 U.S. at 776-77.
13 See id. at 767-68.
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The continued contraction of the per se rule and expansion of the rule
of reason in the last decade would seem to have further minimized the
gap.84 For example, after Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc. all vertical price fixing and resale price maintenance are subject to the
rule of reason.85 In Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, the Supreme Court rejected per
se characterization of a joint venture's setting of prices.6 The Court has
also resisted employment of the so-called "quick look" rule of reason to
strike down certain advertising restrictions of a professional dentist
association, preferring a full-blown rule of reason inquiry.87 Further, some
per se offenses appear to require proof of market power or significant
market foreclosure. For example, the Supreme Court has held that market
power is a trigger for the per se rule in both group boycott88 and tying
cases.
89
Additionally, the Twombly decision9° raised the bar for a plaintiff to
satisfactorily plead the "contract, combination, or conspiracy" requirement
of a Section 1 offense, jettisoning the "no set of facts" standard of Conley v.
Gibson.91 In doing so, the Twombly Court ruled that the plaintiff must, to
84 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886-87 (2007).
85 Id. at 882. See also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (employing the rule of reason
for vertical maximum price fixing).
16 Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006).
87 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779-81 (1999).
88 See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985)
(holding the rule of reason applies unless targeted purchasing "cooperative possesses market power or
unique access to a business element necessary for effective competition."); see also FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) ("[T]he per se approach has generally been limited to cases in which
firms with market power boycott suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from doing
business with a competitor .... (citing Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. 284)); C. Paul Rogers
III, Consumer Welfare and Group Boycott Law, 62 SMU L. REv. 665, 671-72 (2009).
89 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984) ("[W]e have
condemned tying arrangements when the seller has some special ability-usually called 'market
power'--to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market."); U.S.
Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 619-22 (1977) (explaining economic power in the tying
product market required for per se rule); N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); see also ill.
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42-43 (2006) (affirming market power requirement
even for patented goods); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 487 (1992)
(relying on Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, for market power requirement in tying product market). In Hyde, Justice
O'Connor, joined by three others, concurred in the judgment but argued that "[t]he time has ... come to
abandon the 'per se' label" for tying arrangements. 466 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus,
tying missed falling into the rule of reason category by one vote. See id.
90 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
9' Id. at 553, 561-63. See also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Conley had held that
"the accepted rule [is] that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief." Id.
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state a valid claim and withstand a motion to dismiss, plead facts that show
more than a mere possibility of concerted action but bridge the gap to show
the "plausibility" of the alleged conspiracy.92 Stated somewhat differently,
the Court held that, although "detailed factual allegations" are not required,
the complaint must include enough factual information "to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level[.]" 93
Of course, the proof required for a conspiracy for a Section 1 offense
has long been a stumbling block to antitrust plaintiffs.94 Plaintiffs often
have no direct proof of a conspiracy and must prove concerted action by
inferential or circumstantial evidence.95  Historically, the courts have
utilized summary judgments, after discovery has taken place, to throw out
cases where the evidence of an inferential conspiracy is insufficient to raise
a "genuine issue of fact" to proceed to trial.96 While that hurdle remains in
92 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57.
93 Id. at 555. Subsequently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court elaborated in a discrimination case pled
under the First and Fifth Amendments by holding that mere abstract recitals of the elements of a cause
of action supported by conclusory statements are insufficient to state a valid cause of action. 556 U.S.
662, 678-79 (2009).
94 See, e.g., Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-42 (1954);
Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1167-68 (6th Cir. 1995); Del. Valley Marine Supply Co. v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1961); Pevely Diary Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d
363, 367 (8th Cir. 1949).
95 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948); Am. Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 808-10 (1946); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280-83
(1942); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1939); E. States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928,
934-35 (7th Cir. 2000).
96 See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating
Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEo. L.J. 1065, 1106-11 (1986); C. Paul Rogers R]], Summary Judgments
in Antitrust Conspiracy Litigation, 10 LoY. U. CHI. LJ. 667, 679-82 (1979). Compare Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1986) (holding no genuine issue of material fact unless
evidence tends to exclude the possibility of increased competition), and First Nat'l Bank of Ariz- v. Cities Serv.
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 298 (1968) ("[1]t is evident that he has had sufficient discovery either to substantiate his
claims of conspiracy to the extent of raising a material issue of fact thereon. ... ."), and Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc.
v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., 203 F.3d 1028, 1038 (8th Cir. 2000) (en bane) (holding evidence
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact), andIn re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 137
(3d Cir. 1999) ("IT]hey have failed to produce sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove concerted collusion
that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action."), and Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., Inc., 586
F.2d 1163, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating judges are not required to exercise greater caution i  deciding
summary judgment in an antitrust case), with Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Mem'l Gardens, 394 U.S.
700, 702-04 (1969) (holding discovery did not disprove conspiracy), and Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
368 U.S. 464, 491 (1962) (cautioning against summary judgment in antitrust cases where conspirators' motive
and intent are required proof), and Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 509, 514 (2d
Cir. 2004) (reversing summary judgment dismissal as plaintiff presented a material issue of fact), andIn re Flat
Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 378 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding sufficient evidence to reasonably infer a
conspiracy).
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place for antitrust plaintiffs seeking to prove a conspiracy by circumstantial
evidence, Twombly raises the bar at the pleading stage and gets rid of cases
with a lack of factual "plausibility" before discovery takes place.97
As a result, the last decade has certainly continued the reduction of the
reach of Section 1 against concerted action. The classic per se rule, which
does not require proof of market power, is now limited to horizontal price
fixing, 98  bid rigging,99  and market division conspiracies.'00  Thus,
Copperweld's admonition that concerted action "inherently is fraught with
anticompetitive risk" can be called into question given the contraction of
Section 1.101 It may be, in the new age of antitrust, that the underpinnings
as well as the size and existence of the Copperweld gap should be
reconsidered, at least from the collective action side.
IV. EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 SINCE 2000
Section 2 litigation and scholarship have both been vigorous in the last
decade as the debate about what constitutes or should constitute
exclusionary conduct has intensified.10 2  A number of significant
97 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l., Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1336 (1 lth Cir. 2010); Tamburo v.
Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2010); LaFlame v. Societe Air Fr., 702 F. Supp. 2d 136, 150-54
(E.D.N.Y. 2010). Cf Coal. for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495, 499-503
(9th Cir. 2010) (reversing a dismissal that had taken place after discovery). See generally Scott Dodson,
New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2010); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C.
Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010). For critiques of Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, see generally Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010).
98 See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 646-47, 650 (1980).
99 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940).
100 See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 608, 611-12 (1972).
101 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984). Of course, one
can fruitfully argue that the expansion of the rule of reason is a necessary scaling back of Section 1 to
insure that only concerted action, which is at its core anticompetitive, comes under scrutiny. See id.
102 See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J.
527 (2013); Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for Exclusionary
Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 345 (2003); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization
Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253 (2003); Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by
Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (2004); C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu,
Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147 (2005); Kovacic, supra note 10; Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent
Evidence in Monopolization Analysis, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 151 (2004); A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive
Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct-Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST
L.J. 375 (2006); Mark R. Patterson, The Sacrifice of Profits in Non-Price Predation,18-FALL
ANTITRUST 37 (2003); Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of
Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435 (2006); Steven
C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73
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monopolization cases were decided, three by the Supreme Court10 3 and the
United States v. Microsoft Corp. decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for starters.1°4 In addition, the Department of
Justice has recently brought a Section 2 case for the first time since suing
Microsoft in 1999.105
In his 2000 article, Professor Gavil asserted that the Supreme Court
had relaxed Section 2's proof requirements and had become more likely to
deem a monopolist's conduct exclusionary.'°6 Since Section l's proof
standards were increasing and Section 2's decreasing, Professor Gavil
argued that Copperweld's theorized gap was vanishing as the Supreme
Court increasingly merged the concepts of market power and monopoly
power. °7
While the Supreme Court had pretty much put the kibosh on predatory
pricing as a form of exclusionary conduct by the year 2000,108 two other
decisions had seemingly restricted what a monopolist could lawfully do.' 9
In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,1 ° the Court had held
that a monopolist had a duty to continue to cooperate with a rival where the
monopolist had no legitimate business justifications for discontinuing its
collaborative arrangement and where consumers were disadvantaged by the
cessation."1 Subsequently, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (2006); Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2:
The "No Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413 (2006); Jonathan M. Jacobson, Towards a
Consistent Antitrust Policy for Unilateral Conduct, 8 ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2009, at 1, available at
http://www.amnericanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust source/FebO9-Jacobson2 6f.pdf.
'03 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-
Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
104 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).
105 See Complaint at 1, United States v. United Reg'l Healthcare Sys., (N.D. Tex. 2011) (No. 7:11-
cv-0030). In May 2009, the Antitrust Division withdrew its report on enforcement policy under Section
2, which it had released in September 2008. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department
Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009),
httpi/www.justice.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2009i245710.pdf In announcing the withdrawal, Assistant
Attorney General Christine Vamey expressed the view that the withdrawn report had exaggerated the
likelihood that current Section 2 standards over-deter legitimate procompetitive conduct and had
overvalued the prospects that efficiencies could counter the effects of troubling unilateral conduct.
Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Remarks as Prepared for the
Center for American Progress: Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era 6-7 (May 11,
2009), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245711 .pdf.
106 Gavil, supra note 24, at 88.
107 Id. at 88-89.
'08 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219-27 (1993). But
see Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 953-54 (6th Cir. 2005).
109 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
11o Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 585.
. Id at600-11.
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Services, Inc., 12 the Court ruled that a company who seeks to protect its
monopolies in so-called aftermarket repair and service markets through
contractual restrictions with its customers may have engaged in
exclusionary behavior if it can proffer no legitimate business
justifications.113
Both Aspen Skiing and Kodak arguably stand for the proposition that a
monopolist's refusal to deal with rivals is okay only if valid business
reasons exist for the refusal.1 14  If that is what the two cases stand for,
exclusionary conduct standards might seem to be heading back towards the
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) standard where
monopolists must compete with one hand tied behind their back.1 15 Lower




With those two cases as a backdrop, Supreme Court jurisprudence
about conduct which does not directly involve price but which may
foreclose markets to competitors through devices such as exclusive dealing
arrangements is strikingly sparse, at least prior to the 2004 Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP decision.
1 18
Although there are a number of Supreme Court decisions after Alcoa,'1 9 the
112 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. 451.
13 Id. at 483-86. The Kodak decision was an affimnance of a denial of summary judgment by the
Ninth Circuit. Id. at 486. Subsequently, that Court of Appeals approved a finding of unlawful
monopolization. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1203-04 (9th Cir.
1997).
114 See Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 495,496 (1999); see also Alan J. Meese, Property, Aspen, andRefusals to Deal, 73 ANTITRUST
L.J. 81, 82 (2005) (arguing that Aspen impinged property rights and was thus wrongly decided).
115 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[N]o
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing."); see also United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953) (characterizing Alcoa as holding that "one who has
acquired an overwhelming share of the market 'monopolizes' whenever he does business,... apparently
even if there is no showing that his business involves any exclusionary practices." (citation omitted)).
116 See, e.g., SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan, 88 F.3d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 1996); Olympia
Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 377-79 (7th Cir. 1986).
117 See, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2000); PSI
Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 818-21 (6th Cir. 1997); Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 762-63 (7th Cir. 1996); Lee v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 23 F.3d
14, 17-20 (lst Cir. 1994).
.. 8 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). See
infra text accompanying notes 153-68.
119 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563 (1966); Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc.
v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Alcoa, 148 F.2d
416.
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opinions provide precious little guidance about what constitutes
exclusionary conduct, leaving "jur[ies] to divine the metaphysical
difference[s] between" exclusionary conduct and conduct on the merits.12°
Those cases are all remnants of the big is necessarily bad era of antitrust
when the attainment of monopoly power was viewed with great skepticism;
thus, the conduct analysis typically "present[ed] no major problem."
' 121
Into this void stepped the D.C. Circuit in the Microsoft case.122 When
the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in 2001, the Supreme Court had not
considered a non-price exclusionary conduct case under Section 2 for
almost a decade.123  Apart from the case's notoriety due to its high profile
defendant, the mere fact that it represents a per curiam decision by an en
banc Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on an important
substantive issue of law with little meaningful precedent suggests its
significance.
124
Initially, it is important to note that Microsoft was not a pricing case.
125
Rather, the court focused on the defendant's conduct in dealing with its
various vendors, customers, and rivals.126 The government's Section 2 case
centered on the defendant's actions that (1) foreclosed Netscape, the only
significant browser competitor to its own Explorer, from efficient access to
a critical mass of users and (2) stifled threats to companies developing
"middleware" technologies.127 In both instances, Microsoft was alleged to
be protecting its monopoly in the Intel compatible PC operating system
from threats from "nascent" middleware competitors who could eventually
support software applications that could be run on any operating system,
which could thus circumvent Windows, its own operating system. 128
120 Elhauge, supra note 102, at 266.
121 Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571. See generally C. Paul Rogers III, The Antitrust Legacy of
Justice William 0. Douglas, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 895, 924-36 (2008).
'2 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).
123 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
124 See Mcrosof, 253 F.3d at 45, 48.
125 Id. at 68. The government argued before the district court that Microsoft had engaged in
predatory pricing by pricing below cost on its browser, Explorer. Id. That was said to enable it to
preserve its monopoly profits on its Window Operating System, thereby more than recouping its losses
on Explorer. Id. The District Court, however, did not assign liability for predatory pricing, however, and
the government did not press the theory on appeal. Id.
126 Id at 59-&.
127 Id. at 59-60,77-78.
128 Id. at 52-54. Not surprisingly, the relevant product market was hotly disputed. Id. 51-54.
Microsoft argued that "middleware" products and non-Intel compatible operating systems should be
included, especially since the government's case centered on Microsoft's conduct against those very
competitive threats. Id. at 53-54. The court ruled, however, that the middleware threat was only
nascent and that the applications barrier to entry dictated that the narrower market was proper since both
20131
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The court noted that determining whether Microsoft's conduct was
exclusionary or simply vigorous competition could pose a difficult
challenge.1 29  It then, however, went on to define as exclusionary a
monopolist's conduct which has an anticompetitive effect.130 That means,
according to the court, that the conduct "must harm the competitive process
and thereby harm consumers.131
In sorting through the myriad actions of the defendant that the
government argued were exclusionary, the court focused on whether a
specific conduct foreclosed competition on the merits and was not
efficiency justified.1 32 Thus, market foreclosure became the key ingredient
for anticompetitive conduct.133 Implicit in the court's analysis was that if a
nascent potential competitor was foreclosed from eventually entering the
operating systems market, consumers were or would be harmed.1 34 Also
implicit was that the amount of the market foreclosure was significant,
although the court seemingly did not require or note the actual percentage
foreclosed.135
The Microsoft court also considered the relationship of Sections 1 and
2 in conjunction with the defendant's exclusive dealing agreements with so-
called Internet Access Providers (LAPs) 1 36 Those agreements required the
IAPs to promote Explorer exclusively and to keep shipments of Internet
access software using the competing Navigator under a specified
percentage, often 25%, in exchange for certain inducements.137 The
government had argued at trial that these exclusive dealing contracts
violated both Sections 1 and 2.138 The district court had ruled that since
Microsoft had not completely excluded Navigator from reaching potential
users, even though it had blocked the most efficient channels, it had not
software application developers and users much preferred the multiple applications capability of
Windows. Id. at 54.
129 Id. at 58. "The challenge for an antitrust court lies in stating a general rule for distinguishing
between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competitive acts, which increase it." Id.
130 Id at 58-59.
131 Id. at 58.
132 Id at 64.
133 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and
Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 387 (2002).
134 Mcrosof, 253 F.3d at 79.
135 Id. at 54. The court had concluded that Microsoft had 95% of the relevant operating systems
market (80% if the Mac Operating System was included). Id. Thus, any market foreclosure had the
potential to be quite significant, although the foreclosure was to "nascent" potential competitors which
posed a threat sometime in the future. Id. at 79.
136 Id. at 70. "lAPs include both Internet Service Providers [ISPs] ... and Online Services [OLSs]"
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violated Section 1 exclusive dealing law.139 For a Section 1 violation, the
trial court held that the evidence should have shown that Microsoft's
agreements completely excluded Navigator from about 40% of the
market.
40
The trial court, however, found that the same exclusive dealing
contracts did violate Section 2, stating that "the fact that Microsoft's
arrangements with various [LAPs and other] firms did not foreclose enough
of the relevant market to constitute a [Section] 1 violation in no way
detracts from the Court's assignment of liability for the same arrangements
under [Section] 2[.]
' 141
The government did not appeal the trial court's ruling on its Section 1
claim, but Microsoft argued before the Court of Appeals that the trial
court's finding of no liability under Section 1 necessarily precluded a
finding of liability under Section 2 for the same conduct.142  The appellate
court noted that the district court had apparently based its Section 1 holding
on a 'total exclusion test' rather than the 40% standard drawn from the
caselaw.'' 143 But either way, it rejected Microsoft's argument, specifying
that a monopolist's use of exclusive contracts could sometimes violate
Section 2 "even though the contracts foreclose less than the roughly 40% or
50% share usually required in order to establish a [Section] 1 violation."'
44
The court went on to rule that the defendant's exclusive dealing agreements
had in fact violated Section 2, particularly as it entered into them with





141 Id. (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 53 (D.D.C. 2000)).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. See also United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Behavior
that otherwise might comply with antitrust law may be impermissibly exclusionary when practiced by a
monopolist."); LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 401, 422 (E.D. Va. 2009), rev'd, 637 F.3d 435
(4th Cir. 2011) ("[lt is possible for an exclusive dealing agreement to violate [Section] 2, but not
[Section] 1."); Tele Atlas N.V. v. NAVTEQ Corp., No. C-05-01673 RS, 2008 WL 49111230, at *1
(N.D. Cal., Nov. 13, 2008) ("[E]xclusive dealing arrangements hat may not violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act can still run afoul of section 2.").
4 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 70-71.
146 Id. In not specifying a market foreclosure percentage, the court avoided determining whether
foreclosure of sub-markets, such as for lAPs, should be assessed separately. Id. The relevant market
was Intel compatible PC operating systems, but the government's case focused on the fact that Microsoft
was worried about future competition from middleware providers and developers, which were currently
all in different markets. Id. at 52-54, 70-71.
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Thus, the D.C. Court of Appeals arguably acknowledged the existence
of the gap by holding that non-unilateral conduct by a monopolist can be
deemed exclusionary, and thus illegal, although that same conduct does not
violate Section 1.147 That point seems to reaffirm the traditional view that
monopolists do not have the same unfettered freedom in the marketplace as
do non-monopolists.148 While the gap is implicit in the Microsoft decision,
its breadth is subject to debate.
1 49
In the 2004 Trinko decision, the Supreme Court ordered the dismissal
of a complaint which alleged that local telephone companies had engaged in
exclusionary conduct under Section 2 by refusing to facilitate entry by
competitors as required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.150 In
doing so, the Court sharply curtailed any expansive reading of Aspen Skiing
and signaled its discomfort with that decision, stating it "is at or near the
outer boundary of [Section] 2 liability." 151 The Court stated that it did "not
believe that traditional antitrust principles justify adding the present case to
the few existing exceptions from the proposition that there is no duty to aid
,,112competitors.
The Court distinguished Aspen Skiing, in part, by observing that the
case involved "a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an
anticompetitive end."' 53  It noted that the jury verdict there may have been
147 Id at 70-71.
141 See Ei. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d 435, 441 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Aluminum Co.
of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[No monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is
doing."); see also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953)
(characterizing Alcoa as holding that "one who has acquired an overwhelming share of the market 'monopolizes'
whenever he does business .... apparently even if there is no showing that his business involves any exclusionary
practice." (citation omitted)).
149 See Popofsky, supra note 102, at 445 (The Microsoft framework for evaluating exclusionary conduct
under Section 2 "is virtually indistinguishable from the test courts employ under Section l's rule ofreasonP).
i50 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415-16 (2004).
Under the act, defendant incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) were required to allow new or so-
called competitive local exchange carriers access to its local networks through interconnection
agreements. Id. at 402. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant LEC was not doing so adequately and was
thus impeding the ability of competitive LECs to enter local telephone service markets and compete
with defendant's monopoly. Id. at 403-05.
' Id. at 409. Cf Eleanor M. Fox, Is There Life in Aspen After Trinko? The Silent Revolution of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 73 ANTrrRuST L.J. 153, 154 (2005) (arguing that Trinko presents a stronger case for antitrist
liability than did Aspen and thus Mals within Sherman Act Section 2 liability).
152 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411. The Court also rejected the applicability of the essential facilities
doctrine, holding that, even if it applied to the local exchange networks, the extensive government
regulation of the telecommunications industry rendered it unnecessary. Id.
i53 Id at 409. The Court also distinguished Aspen Skiing by noting that it and Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), both involved situations in which a defendant refused to provide
its rivals with a product that it already sold at retail, in contrast to the new wholesale product for leasing
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based on the defendant's willingness "to forgo these short-run benefits
because it was more interested in reducing competition . . . over the long
run by harming its smaller competitor."
'1 54
As a result, some scholars have argued that the Trinko Court adopted a
narrow profit-sacrifice standard for establishing exclusionary conduct under
Section 2, at least in refusal-to-deal scenarios.1 55 That test appears to be
"an intellectual descendant" of the Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. below-cost requirement for predatory pricing,
since both focus on short-term loss, followed by the prospect of longer-term
gain. 56  Indeed, there is concern that Trinko narrows Section 2's intent
requirement to just proof of profit sacrifice, excluding other potential forms
of exclusionary conduct. 
157
Certainly, the Trinko Court signaled a more hospitable view of
monopolies in general, noting that "[t]he mere possession of monopoly
power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not
unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system."158  The
Court went on to express its concerns about "[t]he cost of false positives"
which "counsels against an undue expansion of [Section] 2 liability."' 5 9
Irrespective of whether Trinko adopted a limited profit-sacrifice test
for exclusionary conduct, it does signal a more lenient approach to the
network elements created by 1996 Telecommunications Act. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409-10.
154 -d at 409 (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 (1985)).
'55 Compare Marina Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko: Antitrust Intent and "Sacrifice, " 73 ANTITRUST
L.J. 171, 173 (2005) (arguing Trinko is unduly narrow and "excludes entire categories of potentially
predatory conduct"), and A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws:
Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247, 1267 (2005) (arguing the
sacrifice test is a sensible antitrust analysis for exclusionary conduct that has potential benefits), with
John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Bargaining and Monopolization: In Search of the "Boundary of
Section 2 Liability" Between Aspen and Trinko, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 115, 152 (2005) (arguing that "[t]he
boundary of Section 2 liability remains indistinct" following Trinko), and Frank X. Schoen, Note,
Exclusionary Conduct After Trinko, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1625, 1629-39 (2005) (arguing that Trinko does
not articulate a formalized test for exclusionary conduct).
156 Compare Salop, supra note 102, at 318-19 (arguing the sacrifice test applies in some non-price exclusion
scenarios), with Werden, supra note 102, at 422 n.35 (countering that the sacrifice test is a general principle
sometimes used to rationalize a price-cost test).
157 Lao, supra note 155, at 173. The Trinko Court did quote Microsoft approvingly for recognizing that
"[ujnder the best of circurmstances, applying the requirements of [Section] 2 'can be difficult' because 'the means
of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad.' Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414 (quoting
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam)). But of course,
recognizing that the task is difficult is not inconsistent with employing a limiting standard against which to
measure the "myriad" types of conduct a court may encounter. See id
158 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407. See also Edward D. Cavanagh, Trinko: A Kinder, Gentler Approach to
Dominant Firms Under the Antitrust Laws?, 59 ME. L. REV. 111, 127 (2007).
159 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)
(warning that false positives "are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are
designed to protect.").
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activities of monopolists.160 That suggests, at a minimum, that the Court is
likely to reduce rather than expand the types of monopoly conduct it
believes to be exclusionary.
The Trinko Court twice took pains to identify collusion as a greater
menace to competition than monopolization, referring to it as "the supreme
evil of antitrust[ .],' 16 1 Subsequently, in a footnote, it distinguished United
States v. Terminal Railroad Ass 'n,162 an early case that ruled unlawful an
agreement by fourteen railroads to deny access to a jointly controlled
terminal that was necessary for ingress or egress from St. Louis, and
Associated Press v. United States,163 a decision rendering illegal an
agreement by the Associated Press prohibiting member newspapers from
disseminating news to non-member papers.164 In Trinko, the Court noted
that those "cases involved concerted action, which presents greater
anticompetitive concerns....
Thus, at least in the context of deciding a Section 2 case, the Court in
2004 was still espousing the Copperweld view that concerted action was
more troublesome than conduct by a monopolist.
Three years later, in Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co.,166 the Court scuttled an attempt to characterize as exclusionary
predatory bidding by a monopsonist buyer.67 The Court believed that the
risk of chilling procompetitive behavior was as significant as with predatory
pricing and thus imposed the two-prong Brooke Group test on predatory
bidders.168 In spite of some scholarship to the contrary,169 the Weyerhauser
160 Cavanagh, supra note 158, at 130-31.
161 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
162 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
163 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
'64 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410 n.3; AssociatedPress, 326 U.S. at 4, 19; Terminal RR. Ass "n, 224 U.S. at 397-
400,409-10.
165 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410 n.3. The Court further noted that concerted action "is amenable to a
remedy that does not require judicial estimation of free-market forces: simply requiring that the outsider
be granted nondiscriminatory admission to the club." Id.
'66 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007).
167 Id at 326.
168 Id. at 325. The Brooke Group test as applied to predatory bidding requires proof that (1) the
bidding led to below-cost pricing of the monopsonist's outputs by increasing the costs of its inputs to a
level exceeding the sales price of its outputs, and that (2) the monopsonist will be able to recoup its
losses through the exercise of its monopsony power once it forces its rivals from the market. Id.
169 See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2003) ("Recent scholarship has
challenged the notion that predatory pricing schemes are implausible and irrational."); see also Jonathan
B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTriRUST L.J. 585, 589 (1994)
(positing that predatory pricing can take place in one market and recoupment can occur rapidly in another
market); Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEo. L.i. 2239, 2241
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Court repeated its earlier admonition "'that predatory pricing schemes are
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful."' ' 170 Whether that statement is
correct or not, it is true that predatory pricing and bidding cases are rarely
successful.1
7 1
Although the Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue, attempts to
establish as exclusionary conduct so-called loyalty discounts, package
pricing, or the bundling of a product in which a seller faces vigorous
competition with products in which it is dominant have met with uneven
success in the lower courts.172 In LePage's Inc. v. 3M, the Third Circuit, in
an en banc opinion, affirmed a Section 2 judgment where 3M, the producer
of Scotch Tape, the leading transparent tape, offered rebates on condition
that its customers purchase non-tape related 3M product lines such as post-
it notes and staples.7 3  The plaintiff produced only transparent tape and
argued that it was unable to match the bundled discount, asserting that it
was an equally efficient tape producer. 174 The court found the conduct to be
exclusionary under Section 2 without requiring any proof of below-cost
pricing or analysis of how many customers offered the bundled rebate
actually accepted the deal.'75
Not surprisingly, some courts considering bundled or package
discounts have been reluctant to follow LePage's because if neither the
individual nor the bundled price is below cost the characterization of the
bundle as exclusionary is questionable since both prices are profitable on
their own. 176  Recognizing that, in general, discounted pricing is
procompetitive, several courts have subsequently adopted an "attribution
test" to determine whether a bundled discount is exclusionary in effect.177
(2000) (arguing that the consensus economic theory is that predatory pricing can be a rational and successful
business strategy).
170 Weyerhauser, 549 U.S. at 323 (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209,226 (1993) andMatsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)).
171 One example of a successful predatory pricing case is Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005).
72 See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254,269 (2012) (loyalty discounts); Masimo Corp.
v. Tyco Health Care Grp., 350 F. App'x 95, 97 (9th Cir. 2009) (bundled package pricing); LePage's Inc. v. 3M,
324 F.3d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (bundled rebate discounts).
173 LePage's, 324 F.3d at 144-45, 154. See also SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089
(E.D. Pa. 1976), aft'd, 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978).
174 LePage's, 324 F.3d at 144-45, 156, 161.
'_1 Id at 157. For critiques of LePage's ee Richard A. Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level Playing
Field? The New Antitrust Paradox, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 49, 49 (2005); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 3M's Bundled
Rebates: An Economic Perspective, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 244-45 (2005); Joanna Warren, Comment,
LePage's v. 3M: An Antitrust Analysis ofLoyalty Rebates, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1605, 1607 (2004).
176 See, e.g., HOVENKAIP, supra note 48, at 404-05.
177 See, e.g., Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2009); Cascade Health Solutions v.
PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Info. Res., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 359 F. Supp.
2d 307, 307-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying the Virgin holding that "[w]hen price discounts in one market are
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Under that approach, one attributes the entire discount in the package or
bundle to the product for which exclusion is claimed. 178 Only if the
resulting price is less than the defendant's cost for that product is the
bundled discount deemed exclusionary.
179
In one bundling case, Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's vacating of a jury verdict, ruling
that the plaintiff could not establish the unlawfulness of defendant's
bundled pricing because it had not alleged that the prices were below some
appropriate measure of defendant's costs.18 However, the court affirmed
the part of the jury verdict which held that defendant's sole-source and
market-share contracts were exclusionary and violative of Section 2.181
Under those agreements, customers were required to purchase 90% to 95%
of their requirements for all the bundled products in order to receive the
bundled discount.
182
In a subsequent case against the same defendant, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that its sole-source and market-share discount agreements were not
exclusionary since they were easily terminable, allowing customers to forgo
the discounts and purchase cheaper generic products.183  The court
distinguished Masimo by noting that there defendant's patent was still in
place, obligating customers to buy its complementary sensor product.
84
Further, the Masimo sole-source contracts required customers to purchase a
set percentage of their requirements to obtain the discount, whereas in the
bundled with the price charged in a second market, the discounts must be applied to the price in the second
market in determining whether that price is below that products average variable cost"); Virgin Atl. Airways
Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aft'd, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting the Ortho holding that "there would be an antitrust violation if the competitive product in the bundle were
sold for a price below average variable cost after the discounts on the monopoly items in the bundle were
subtracted from the price of that competitive product."); Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F.
Supp. 455, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (cautioning that other rules would create a substantial risk of harming
consumers by protecting ineffective competitors). Cf Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P., 350 F.
App'x 95, 97 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding the discount attribution test may not apply outside of bundling pricing,
such as in tying arrangements or exclusive dealing cases).
171 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 906.
179 Id. at 903. But see J. Shahar Dillbary, Predatory Bundling and the Exclusionary Standard, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1231, 1234 (2010) (arguing that below-cost test is over-inclusive and that some
below cost bundles may enhance consumer welfare).
's0 Masimo, 350 F. App'x at 96-97.
I8'd at 97-98.
182 Id. at 98-99. The court noted that the sole source component of the agreement is "the hallmark of
exclusive dealing" because it "effectively prevents customers from dealing in the goods of competitors, if the
customers want to obtain [defendant's] discount." Id at 97.
183 Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991,997 (9th Cir. 2010).
'" Id. at 997 n2.
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subsequent case the discount and requirements percentages were
graduated.185
Thus, although there has been some judicial recognition that sole-
source and market-share discounts can have exclusionary effects,'8 6 some
courts have tended to treat bundling discounts as akin to predatory pricing,
requiring proof of below-cost selling. In its 2009 Pacific Bell Telephone
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc. decision,87 the Supreme Court
appeared to affirm a hard-line position that all above-cost challenges to
pricing are beyond the Sherman Act pale.188 There it considered a price-
squeezing claim against a vertically integrated monopolist by a non-
integrated rival.1 89 The Court, still mindful of chilling vigorous price
competition and finding no duty to deal with a rival after Trinko, held that
the plaintiff must meet the two-prong Brooke Group requirement to state a
Sherman Act claim.'90 It emphasized that the charging of monopoly prices
by a monopolist does not run afoul of Section 2.191
Shortly thereafter the Ninth Circuit, in Doe v. Abbott Laboratories,
ruled that linkLine mandated dismissal of a bundling case that plaintiffs
attempted to characterize as monopoly leveraging.192 There, defendant had
a monopoly in the HIV "booster" drug market through a drug called Norvir,
which boosts the effectiveness of protease inhibitors used to fight the
disease.193  It sold Norvir as part of its own "boosted" protease inhibitor
drug, Kaletra.194  After the FDA approved the use of Norvir with the
protease inhibitor drugs of other companies, defendant quadrupled the price
of Norvir but it did not increase the price of Kaletra.195 The Ninth Circuit
185 Id. That is, the greater percentage of requirements purchased, the higher the discount. Id. at 995.
186 See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 273-75 (3d Cir. 2012); Natchitoches
Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd., No. 1:05-CV-12024-PBS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108858, at
*11, *25 (D. Mass. Nov. 20, 2009) (denying summary judgment against a loyalty discount claim).
187 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
181 Id. at 457.
169 Id. at 442. In a price-squeezing claim, the vertically integrated defendant increases prices in a
wholesale market where it has market power while selling low in a retail market. Id. at 449. The
resulting price squeeze raises competitors' costs because they have to pay more at wholesale while
lowering their revenues because it must reduce retail prices to match the defendant's. Id.
190 Id. at 451. But see Bonjomo v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 808, 810-11 (3d Cir.
1984) (finding liability where price squeeze drove plaintiWs revenue down to a level just above its average
variable costs but insufficient to allow it to earn a profit).
19' linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. at 454.
192 Doev. Abbot Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2009).
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found that absent proof of below-cost pricing the defendant had acted
legally. 196
Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Doe was quick to treat what appears to be a
bundling claim as predatory pricing controlled by linkLine, even though
there was nothing to suggest hat the linkLine price squeeze had anything to
do with bundling. The case suggests a trend in some circuits to create a safe
haven for any pricing decisions by a monopolist which are not below
cost.19 7 It may also indicate a disinclination to treat as bundling what can be
otherwise characterized as predatory pricing, even though Doe involved the
raising of prices rather than the lowering of prices to force out rivals.1 98
In ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., the Third Circuit, however,
recently veered away from such a hardline approach in a loyalty discount
case.'99 It held that the cost-price test applies to loyalty discounts only if
"price [itself] is the clearly predominant mechanism of exclusion" and
proceeded to apply the rule of reason to what it characterized as "de facto
exclusive dealing contracts[.]
a20 0
Although one can persuasively argue that a circuit split exists with
respect to the exclusionary effects of bundling, package pricing, and loyalty
discounts, the Supreme Court has so far declined to enter the fray, most
recently denying certiorari in the Meritor case.20 ' Thus, at this writing,
predatory pricing analysis has yet to swallow all forms of monopolist
conduct that involves price in some fashion.
V. SECTION 2 "TRENDING"
In assessing the current state of exclusionary conduct law, one should
first acknowledge that the two principal non-price Section 2 decisions since
2000, Microsoft and Trinko, may conflict.20 2 If Trinko did indeed establish
a profit-sacrifice test for determining exclusionary conduct,203 it is doubtful
196 Id at935.
197 Seeid
'98 See Abbot Labs., 571 F.3d at 935.
'99 ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2025 (2013).
200 Id. at 269.
201 id.
202 See Verizon Conmc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).
203 The test was first proposed in Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of
Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 9-10 (1981). See also Advanced Health-Care
Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 148 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining a short term sacrifice harns
competition when it furthers an exclusive, anticompetitive objective); Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786
F.2d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (placing otherwise valid business practices in the context of predation and
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that Microsoft meets the standard for much of the conduct found
unlawful.204 As noted, the court there focused on the market foreclosure
resulting from the various market machinations of the defendant in
suppressing potential competitors, not whether that foreclosure cost
Microsoft any short-term profits.0 5 It is unlikely, for example, that
Microsoft lost sales by its exclusive dealing agreements with fourteen of the
fifteen largest APs.2°6 Arguably, there it was just using its monopoly
position to bludgeon the lAPs into exclusivity contracts, a long identified
type of exclusionary conduct.0 7
Secondly, it is apparent that the Brooke Group predatory pricing
paradigm has expanded beyond classic predatory pricing scenarios.208  As
noted above and in the literature,2°9 Trinko's emphasis on proof of short-
term loss with the prospect of long-term monopoly profits is, if not derived
from Brooke Group, perfectly consistent with it. Further, the Court has
directly applied the Brooke Group standard to all Section 2 conduct
involving the setting of prices, making it clear that above-cost pricing by a
monopolist is not exclusionary.210  Lower federal courts have split when
faced with more cutting-edge conduct issues like bundling or loyalty
discounts.211
In linkLine the Supreme Court, in dicta, suggested its present view
about whether price and non-price conduct should be treated differently
when it wrote that, "for antitrust purposes, there is no reason to distinguish
between price and non-price components of a transaction.,212 To the extent
that Section 2 conduct issues are all progeny of Brooke Group, the range of
what can constitute exclusionary conduct narrows considerably.213  In
monopolization when aggressively used to drive out rivals and close entry to the market).
204 See Aicrosofi, 253 F.3d 34.
20' Id. at 57.
206 See id at 67-71. Some of Microsoft's conduct might meet the Trinko standard, however. See id.
at 72-74. For example, Microsoft's threat to Apple to cancel Mac Office if Apple did not make Internet
Explorer the standard installed web browser on Apple computers appears to satisfy the profit-sacrifice
standard. Id.
207 See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 148, 154-55 (1951) (holding the
dominant newspaper violated Section 2 by requiring advertisers to advertise exclusively with it and not
on a competing radio station).
200 See supra text accompanying notes 166-86.
209 See Salop, supra note 102, at 318-20.
210 See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,414 (2004).
211 See supra text accompanying notes 172-86.
212 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 450 (2009). The Court also stated that
"[t]here is no meaningful distinction between the ... claims we rejected in Trinko and the plaintiffs' price-
squeeze claims[,]" although it did go on to apply the Brooke Group predatory pricing test. Id. at 450-452.
213 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223-25 (1993) (limiting
predatory pricing to below-cost pricing with a reasonable prospect of recouping costs by excluding rivals from
the market).
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contrast, the Microsoft foreclosure standard is not so limiting and may even
be expansive in application, particularly when one considers its ruling that
exclusive dealing contracts that run afoul of Section 2 may not violate
Section 1.214
Thirdly, Trinko and Microsoft appear to disagree philosophically about
the relationship of Sections 1 and 2. While the Court in Trinko took pains
to note that collusion was of greater antitrust concern than
monopolization,215 Microsoft identifies exclusive dealing contracts that
violate Section 2 but not Section 1.216
The conflict between Trinko and Microsoft may play out in cutting-
edge conduct cases involving, for example, loyalty, sole-source, or market-
share discounts. There is substantial literature that these types of discounts
from monopolists in reality exact penalties for non-compliance and
foreclose markets to rivals, even where the discounted prices are above
cost.2 17 Under the Microsoft approach, a court could find that kind of
conduct to be exclusionary, particularly since that type of pricing behavior
produces no discernible efficiencies.218  If, however, the courts treat the
conduct as pricing falling under the Brook Group rubric, any loyalty prices
set above cost would fall beyond the exclusionary pale.219 Further, under
the profit-sacrifice test it would be presumably very difficult to show that a
monopolist was sacrificing profits when selling goods or services above
cost.
22 °
Of course, much of what may constitute exclusionary conduct is not,
strictly speaking, unilateral conduct. Exclusive dealing agreements are,
after all, two-party contracts.221 Similarly, often sellers with market power
require buyers to agree to sole-source, dual-source, or loyalty requirements,
214 See supra text accompanying notes 128-48.
215 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08. See also Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2010);
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
216 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).
217 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1203
n.198 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Elhauge, supra note 102, at 320-23; Thomas
G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power
Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 234-45 (1986); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffinan, Raising Rivals'
Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 267 (1983); Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil W. Averitt,
Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 615, 615, 622-24, 627 (2000).
218 See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 70-71.
219 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,223 (1993).
220 See id.
221 1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 8:3.
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whether formally in writing or only verbally.222  In contrast, conduct
involving pricing223 and refusals to deal more readily fit what we normally
consider to be single-firm conduct.224
But, as noted above, Microsoft stands for the proposition that a
monopolist's exclusive dealing contracts are more suspect than exclusive
dealing contracts by a non-monopolist.225 Similarly, the academic literature
and a growing number of cases suggest that monopoly-driven loyalty and
other restrictive agreements are more likely to effectively foreclose rivals
than those not involving market power.226
All of this is to say that there remains a great deal of uncertainty about
the parameters of and appropriate test or tests for discerning exclusionary
conduct under Section 2. If the Trinko Court's language about he
desirability of monopolists and monopoly prices continues to have judicial
legs, however, it would seem that monopolists will continue to have far
greater competitive leeway than previously thought possible.
VI. GAP IMPACT
As noted above, the Copperweld Court observed that the size of the
antitrust gap "is open to serious question.227 What the Court did not
acknowledge, at least explicitly, is that the size of the gap may in fact
change as the ever-fluid antitrust law evolves and shrinks2.2 8 For example,
222 See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir. 2008)
(explaining a package discount forces a buyer to either accept the discount by buying the package or
forego saving and purchase each product individually); LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir.
2003) (en banc) (requiring buyers meet a target number of purchases in order to earn a rebate); Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 148-49, 154-55 (1951) (requiring advertisers to advertise
exclusively with it in order to reach its widespread readership); see also Elhauge, supra note 102, at
282-84 (arguing that buyers agree to such programs for the short-term savings despite the long-term
effects on the market).
223 Of course, one can argue that a buyer's decision to purchase a good or service offered by a monopolist
thereby enters into a contract with the monopolist See Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 900-01.
Similarly, bundled pricing can be accepted or rejected by a buyer, but technically a contract ensues if the buyer
purchases the bundle. Id
224 See generally Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. 209; Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585, 608 (1985); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).
225 See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 70-71. See supra text accompanying notes 141-48.
226 See supra note 172 and accompanying text; Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 217, at 1206; Tom,
Balto & Averitt, supra note 217, at 627; MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST
ECONOMICs 147-48 (2006); Patrick Greenlee, David Reitman & David Sipley, An Antitrust Analysis of
Bundled Loyalty Discounts, 26 INT'L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 1132, 1134 (2008).
227 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,777-78 (1984).
228 See id.
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to the extent that Section 2 exclusionary conduct standards become
narrower, one might argue that the size of the gap increases
commensurately. That is, the expansion of the Brooke Group predatory
pricing paradigm and the imposition of a profit-sacrifice test would give
monopolists considerably more competitive leeway, restrict what
constitutes exclusionary conduct, and thus arguably expand the gap from
the Section 2 side.
Similarly, the expansion of the rule of reason and the tougher
conspiracy pleading standards emanating from Twombly, making it more
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in Section 1 cases, may have had the same
effect from the collective action side of the gap.229 That is, one can argue
that the gap widens as potential Section 1 liability narrows because non-
monopolists have more latitude in the marketplace than previously as fewer
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies are likely to be found to restrain
trade.
As a result, one might assert that case law has widened the gap from
both sides of the aisle in the last decade or so as antitrust law has in general
retracted. Monopolists and non-monopolists alike would seem to have
more latitude to operate in the marketplace free from potential antitrust
liability. Further, one might posit that, with the retrenchment from both
sides, the gap is now considerably wider than it was at the time of the
Copperweld decision in 1984.
But it is important to keep one's eye on the ball. One might assert hat,
with the shrinking of the antitrust law today, the only real antitrust gap lies
between collusion among competitors, "the supreme evil of antitrust[,'
230
and exclusionary conduct by a monopolist, which may or may not be
2311unilateral, but typically does not involve agreements with competitors.
229 One may argue that the American Needle decision, in rejecting the single entity defense, actually
expands conduct that is considered collective in nature. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201
(2010). While that may be true, the Court there specified that the professional sports league activity
falls under the rule of reason where market power and impact are sure to be predicates to liability. See
id. at 2216.
230 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
231 An exception is the reverse payment drug cases where the patent holder pays a generic
manufacturer to stay out of market. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); Ark.
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (no antitrust
violation); Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbot Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009)
(remanded for fact determination); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (no antitrust violation); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (1 1th
Cir. 2005) (no antitrust violation); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1313 (11 th
Cir. 2003) (full rule of reason required); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir.
2003). See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 48, at 271-72. See generally C. Scott Hemphill, An
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Perhaps, but to do so belies the gap's Colgate vertical origins.232 Indeed,
Copperweld, which spawned the modem version, involved not an alleged
horizontal conspiracy but an agreement between a parent steel manufacturer
and its subsidiary steel tubing maker.233
In this case, the ball is unilateral conduct by non-monopolists, which
the Court has recognized as sacrosanct since its 1919 Colgate decision.234
Indeed, Colgate is the foundation of the antitrust gap, focusing as it does on
the untrammeled right of a non-monopolist seller to refuse to deal with
anyone without fear of antitrust liability. 235  Since Colgate involved a
vertical, rather than a horizontal restraint, it is a fundamental error to
consider the gap relevant, at least historically, only with respect to
horizontal combinations.
To take an older example, consider the impact of the 1977 Continental
T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. decision,236 which held that vertical non-
price restraints such as manufacturer-imposed location or customer
restrictions should be judged under the rule of reason, overruling an earlier
decision.237 As a result, only manufacturers with substantial market power
have anything to fear under the rule of reason. Most courts, following the
Sylvania Court's lead, view non-price restraints as potentially pro-
competitive, at least where the manufacturer has little market share.38 Not
surprisingly, successful attacks of vertical non-price restraints are very
rare.
239
Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 629 (2009).
232 See United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 306-08 (1919).
233 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 755-56.
234 Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307 ("In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the
act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer ... freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal[.]"). As noted, Copperweld acknowledged
that the sanctity of unilateral conduct goes back to Colgate. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 775-76.
23 See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307
236 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
237 Id. at 59. (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)). See
generally C. Paul Rogers II, Restraints on Alienation in Antitrust Law: A Past With No Future, 49 SMU
L. REv. 497 (1996) (arguing Sylvania marked the end of the antitrust policy of protecting restraints
against alienation).
238 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-55. Absent a manufacturer's holding of substantial market power,
the impact of downstream non-price restraints on the interbrand wholesale or retail markets is likely to
be insignificant. See Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1200 (9th Cir. 2012); Jacobs v.
Tempur-Pedic Int'l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2010); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
579 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1978); Campbell v. Austin Air Sys., Ltd., 423 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67-69
(W.D.N.Y. 2005).
239 One exception is Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir.
1983).
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More recently, the Supreme Court, in overturning per se rules for
maximum and minimum resale price maintenance, has also pointed to the
potential efficiencies of those practices.240 As with non-price restraints, the
switch to the rule of reason for resale price maintenance brought about by
the Leegin decision241 signals that most sellers, absent significant market
power, can impose resale price agreements on wholesalers and retailers
with a high degree of impunity.242  Thus, all vertical price and non-price
practices are unlikely to run afoul of the antitrust laws absent market power
significant enough to adversely impact the interbrand market and to
243overcome efficiency assertions.
By the same token, a restricted view of what can constitute
exclusionary conduct under Section 2 simply permits greater latitude for
those with monopoly power to compete.244  But if a company does not
possess monopoly power in a relevant market, the exclusionary conduct
issue is quite sensibly moot.245  Thus, strictly speaking, a more lenient
application of Section 2 has no direct impact on single-firm conduct by a
non-monopolist, leaving the antitrust gap unaffected.246 A more tolerant
240 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 894-99 (2007); State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 14-16 (1997); see also Jacobs, 626 F.3d at 1342 (undercutting the minimum
distributors' price on its online product would harm distributors ability to display the product and harm
consumers); Valuepest.com of Charlotte, Inc. v. Bayer Corp., 561 F.3d 282, 293 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding
resale price maintenance can promote interbrand competition); Trane U.S. Inc. v. Meehan, 563 F. Supp.
2d 743, 751 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (finding the principal's commissioned agents were not a separate legal
entity and thus not capable of conspiring with the principal); Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc.,
558 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (applying the rule of reason to find a causal nexus between a
retailer monopoly power and retailer's higher price).
241 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 897-99.
242,22see id
243 In the Section 2 context, downstream price and non-price restrictions by a monopolist often may
not amount to exclusionary conduct under Section 2, which typically requires an impact on a rival of,
rather than a buyer from, the seller. See, e.g., Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d
919, 927 (9th Cir. 1980).
244 Section 2, of course, pointedly outlaws monopolizing, not just the acquiring or holding of
monopoly power. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). Although the Court in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.
(Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945) ("no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is
doing"), arguably came close to a so-called no-conduct standard, Trinko, as noted, presents a 180-degree
shift. See supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
245 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 381 (1956). That is,
under the two-prong analysis necessary to prove a Section 2 violation, one does not get to the second or
exclusionary conduct prong unless the target company is found to possess monopoly power in a relevant
market. Id. at 381.
246 See Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). It could, however, have an
indirect effect by not constraining the market conduct of those who may have market power but believe
they do not. Id. at 457-5 8. The attempt to monopolize offense of Section 2, however, may work in the
opposite direction and constrain the market behavior of those firms. Id. at 459. Although, since the
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Section 2 application does affect, however, allowable behavior by
247monopolists which in turn does impact the gap.
As noted, the gap's prdcis is that it allows competitors free reign in the
marketplace if acting unilaterally because antitrust law is about protecting
competition, not just fair competition and certainly not competitors.248
Thus, a non-monopolist's dirty tricks such as the disparagement of a
competitor's products, or the stealing of a rival's trade secrets, customer
lists, or valued employees does not an antitrust cause of action make. To
the extent that monopolists are allowed more and more latitude to compete
vigorously rather than just fairly, a monopolist's conduct may more closely
resemble unassailable, even though unfair or unethical, unilateral conduct
by a non-monopolist.
249
For example, today the difficulty of proving predatory pricing means
that monopolists have almost free reign with their pricing decisions, just as
do non-monopolists. Perhaps that is as it should be, but the point is that the
freedom of monopolists to compete in the market means that, as a practical
matter, there is little difference between antitrust scrutiny of monopolists
and non-monopolists, at least where pure unilateral conduct is concerned.
250
In fact, the Supreme Court expressly so stated in linkLine, holding "there
are rare instances in which a dominant firm may incur antitrust liability for
purely unilateral conduct.",251 The more closely the allowable unilateral
conduct of monopolists resembles that of non-monopolists, the smaller the
252antitrust gap.
The reduction of the gap is even more stark when one considers its
Colgate origins. The greater the expansion of permissible monopolist
behavior, the less significant the Colgate exception.253 That is, the less
Supreme Court's decision in Spectrum Sports, there have been precious few successful attempt cases.
See, for example, the unsuccessful attempts claim in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).
247 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1977).
248 See, e.g., Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 641 (3d Cir. 1996); Spectrum Sports,
506 U.S. at 456.
249 That is, unassailable from an antitrust perspective. There is support, however, for the notion that
deceptive advertising by a monopolist that targets a rival may be deemed exclusionary. See Caribbean
Broad. Sys. Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm.
Mfrs. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 916-17 (2d Cir. 1988); Alternative Electrodes, LLC v. Empi, Inc.,
597 F. Supp. 2d 322, 331-32 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Z-Tel Commc'ns, Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 331 F.
Supp. 2d 513, 530 (E.D.Tex. 2004).
250 See, for example, ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268-89 (3d Cir. 2012) where
the court, in its exclusive dealing analysis, seemingly does not differentiate between Section 1 and
Section 2 in affirming a jury verdict under both sections and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
251 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009). Predatory pricing was the only
example the Court gave ofunilateral action that might be exclusionary. Id.
252 See id.; see also Gavil, supra note 24, at 88.
253 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
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scrutiny given the unilateral conduct of monopolists, the smaller the
difference between that allowable conduct and the sacrosanct unilateral
conduct of non-monopolists extolled in Colgate. The smaller the difference
between allowable monopolist unilateral conduct and unilateral conduct
protected by Colgate, the smaller the antitrust gap. Thus, certainly
following linkLine, the Colgate exception language: "[i]n the absence of
any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly," has become largely
symbolic.254
As noted, assuming the existence of collective action, the reduction of
per se offenses and the expanded use of the rule of reason at least facially
mean that more collective conduct is viewed as not trade restraining and not
in violation of Section 1. At best, the expansion of the rule of reason
creates gap uncertainty, to the extent that the rule of reason makes it harder
to predict what is to be tolerated.255  However, as Professor Gavil pointed
out, the growth of the rule of reason and the enhanced reliance on market
power make Section 1 cases appear more like Section 2 cases, reducing the
256Copperweld gap. But, as argued above, the tougher Section 2
exclusionary conduct standards of the last decade, excepting the Microsoft
case, do not seem to cut the other way, as one might initially believe.
Further complicating the issue is that much of what may constitute
exclusionary conduct by a monopolist is really not unilateral action at all.257
This is not a small point because much antitrust history is devoted to
determining whether an agreement or conspiracy can be inferred, in both
the horizontal and vertical contexts. Indeed, prior to the Supreme Court's
overturning of the per se rule for resale price maintenance in Leegin, cases
frequently revolved around whether a seller's resale price maintenance
218involved an agreement or was shielded by the Colgate decision. If there
254 Id.
255 The quick look might be thought to reduce that uncertainty, until one recalls the lengthy Supreme
Court split in California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999), over whether the quick look
should apply or not.
256 Gavil, supra note 24, at 88-89, 102-03. Professor Gavil also makes the related point that the market
share thresholds for establishing market power will likely be lower than previously thought Id. at 109-10. For
monopoly power, however, the courts still seem to require a market share of at least 50/o to prove monopoly
power. See, e.g., Brian A. Facey & Dany H. Assaf Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance in Canada, the
United States, and the European Union: A Survey, 70 ANTrrRUST LJ. 513, 536-37 & n-100 (2002); see also
Elhauge, supra note 102, at 336 ("[Alntitrust courts seem to have intuitively grasped the economic significance
of having a 50% market share without articulating the theory that supports it").
257 See supra text accompanying notes 172-86.
258 See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988) (requiring an
agreement on price or price levels for per se rule); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 767-68 (1984) (holding dealer complaints alone not enough to infer an agreement); United States
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was no agreement o be found or inferred, the conduct was protected by
Colgate and would fall within the antitrust gap, just as with alleged but
unproven horizontal agreements.9
But the expansion of the rule of reason has in many cases rendered the
existence of an agreement if not moot then certainly of lesser importance.
For example, Leegin effectively renders the Colgate issue without
significance in most resale price maintenance cases because, unless a seller
has some significant indicia of market power, a court will not likely
consider whether the resale price is a product of agreement or is unilateral
action.260 As a result, few private plaintiffs will bring lawsuits where proof
of a conspiracy or agreement will have to be established by inference if the
underlying conduct is subject to the rule of reason.261
Thus, as the rule of reason expands to include more and more potential
restraints of trade, less conduct by non-monopolists is likely to be
considered collective in nature because, under the rule of reason, it simply
does not matter. That means that, as a practical matter, less conduct by
non-monopolists now comes under antitrust scrutiny at all. Further,
although the historical roots of the gap lie in vertical restraints case law,
present-day antitrust doctrine is but little concerned with vertical restraints
of any shape or color. Thus, viewed in this way, one could posit that the
gap has broadened as more single-firm upstream or downstream conduct
occurs free from antitrust challenge.262 But in fact it is more likely that the
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43 (1960) (finding more than a mere refusal to deal to be an
agreement); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 452-53 (1922) (finding that a formal
contract not necessary to show agreement); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 210
(1921) (stating that an inferential agreement is a jury question); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc.,
252 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1920) (finding that express agreements not necessary to prove a Section 1
violation); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 939-40 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding defendant had gone
far beyond Colgate). Cf Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1983)
(finding widespread practice of complying with manufacturer's pricing preferences protected by
Colgate).
259 See supra text accompanying notes 85-89. Thus, the significance of Colgate has waned for three
reasons: (1) the shift of antitrust law away from vertical restraints; (2) the difference between allowable
unilateral monopolist and non-monopolist conduct has shrunk; (3) the shift to the rule of reason in all
vertical restraints cases has made the proof of vertical conspiracies to avoid the Colgate exception far
less important.
260 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 894-99, 907 (2007). The same is
true in non-price vertical restraints arising under Cont ' T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59
(1977).
261 For example, Leegin, 551 U.S. 887, involved strong evidence of a vertical agreement but one
wonders how many resale price maintenance cases are likely where the plaintiff has to prove both an
agreement by inference and then the unreasonableness of the underlying price fixing.
262 Here one could argue that United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per
curiam), actually expands the range of Section 2 exclusionary conduct but that expansion involves exclusive
dealing agreements rather than purely unilateral conduct See stqra text accompanying notes 122-48.
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gap has shrunk as the range of Section 1 liability and the differences
between the two sections have narrowed.263
VII. CONCLUSION
While the concept of the antitrust gap seems to be a straightforward
and sensible way to easily differentiate between the reach of Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act, in application the contours of the gap are complex.
Consideration of the size, shape, and perhaps even the continued existence
of the gap involves a number of moving parts.
Conceptually, the gap, as the Supreme Court implicitly recognized in
American Needle,2 4 still has appeal because vigorous unilateral competition
by those without appreciable market power makes for lower prices, greater
innovation, and higher quality goods and services, at least according to
traditional microeconomic theory. But the gap itself is overrated, at least
from an antitrust policy perspective, because it purports to provide more
clarity than actually exists in the case law. Modem antitrust analysis
provides conflicting indicators about the size and direction of the gap; it is
at best blurred, confusing, and shifting, depending on which of the several
moving parts one considers and how one interprets them.
The increased tolerance for monopolistic behavior, for example, does
not necessarily widen the gap because Section 1 cases falling under the rule
of reason also require proof of market power and anticompetitive conduct,
creating significant convergence between the two substantive sections of
the Sherman Act. As the Supreme Court observed in linkLine, that
tolerance also suggests that a monopolist's allowable unilateral behavior
more closely mirrors that allowed under Colgate, the gap's founding case,
than previously thought.65 Thus, the contraction of what may constitute
exclusionary conduct under Section 2 in fact reduces the size of the gap,
which in turn has the effect of minimizing the importance of the Colgate
monopolization exception.
Further, the shift of antitrust law away from concerns about vertical
restraints means that Section 1 today is chiefly about horizontal rather than
263 Instead, the real divide in modem antitrust law may be between rule-of-reason and per se cases.
As noted, rule of reason cases require proof of market power, look more and more like Section 2 cases,
and are increasingly difficult to win. Per se cases, once so characterized, are now limited, with the
exception of tying and some group boycott cases, to hardcore restraints of trade among rivals. See supra text
accompanying notes 98-100. But that is the subject of another article.
264 Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
265 See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438,450-51 (2009).
[Vol. 52:67
The Incredible Shrinking Antitrust Law
vertical combinations. Indeed, almost all of contemporary private antitrust
litigation involves allegations of per se violations such as price fixing,
market division, or boycott activity underlying an attempt, frequently
unsuccessful, of proving a conspiracy among competitors. But more to the
point, the growth of the rule of reason continues to narrow the size of the
gap as non-per se Section 1 cases look more and more like Section 2 cases.
Further, enhanced conspiracy pleading standards also suggest greater
latitude for non-monopolist behavior, although much competitive activity
involves contracts or agreements of some kind rather than, strictly speaking,
unilateral conduct. It is just that most marketplace conduct does not restrain
trade and in the current antitrust world even less is thought to now than
historical precedent suggests.
As the antitrust paradigm continues to shift, the overall effect is that
substantive antitrust law is shrinking. Monopolists and non-monopolists
both have greater latitude to compete vigorously by engaging in conduct
once thought to be illegal or at best questionable. That enhanced ability to
compete means that today any emphasis on unilateral action stemming from
Colgate is overrated and, when one digs down into the weeds, so is the
antitrust gap.
While the gap has a broad conceptual utility and was recently
implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in the American Needle
decision, its functional importance under modem antitrust law is not
significant. It is now more a house of straw than a fundamental antitrust
precept. Antitrust law is not only shrinking, but converging and, as a result,
the traditional antitrust gap is shrinking as well, and is perhaps on the way
to disappearing altogether.
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